We publish two annexes, one is from a US newspaper and, the other, of a Yankee imperialism research center:
1. In Ukraine, Russia progresses little by little after death,
The San Juan Daily Star.
2.
Center for Strategic and International Studies
TRANSCRIPT,
Event:
“Ukraine in the balance: a
Update of the battlefield on the war
In Ukraine "
In Ukraine, Russia progresses little by little death after death
·
o
The San Juan Daily Star
2 days ago
§
Members of a humanitarian group transport the body of a
Russian military near Koroviy Yar, in the Donetsk region in Ukraine, 7
January 2023. Russia has made several adjustments after a disastrous year, but
It still seems much more comfortable absorbing large losses of troops and
team, even to achieve small profits. (Nicole Tung/The New York
Times)
Por Thomas Gibbons-Neff y Anatoly Kur
When the Russian army launched its offensive against the city
from Avdiivka, in eastern Ukraine, the past fall, the Ukrainian troops
They noticed a change in their tactics as column after column of forces
Russians were devastated by artillery fire.
Russian forces divided their infantry formations
In smaller units to avoid being bombarded, while the amount
of Russian air attacks increased to tear down the city's defenses.
It was one of several adjustments that the Russians made to help
to reverse your luck after a disastrous first year. But these changes
were obscured by an obvious fact: the Russian army was still
much more willing to absorb large losses in troops and equipment, even
Get small profits.
Russian forces have a different pain threshold, he said
This month a senior western official, as well as an unorthodox vision of
which is considered an acceptable level of military losses.
Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian and Russian soldiers have
result injured or dead from the beginning of the Russian in large scale,
including tens of thousands last year in the Battle for the Eastern City
from Bakhmut. Another city to the south, Marinka, fell into the hands of Russia in January,
After intense fighting and more losses.
Avdiivka was one of the most expensive. The diverse
Russian casual estimates that circulate among military analysts, bloggers
Prorruse and Ukrainian officials suggest that Moscow lost more troops
Taking Avdiivka that in 10 years of fighting in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
But victims figures are difficult to verify:
are inflated on the side that causes them and minimized on the side that
He suffers, which leaves the real cost unknown. The official figure is considered to be
Of Soviet dead in Afghanistan, around 15,000, is very underestimated.
An outstanding military blogger wrote that the Russians had
lost 16,000 soldiers in Avdiivka, a figure that is still
impossible to confirm.
"Despite Russia's great losses in Avdiivka,
They still have an advantage of personnel along the front and can continue
The attacks in multiple directions, "said Rob Lee, a researcher
principal of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, based in
Philadelphia
Russia's slow advance occurs when nations
Europeans take measures to reinforce support for Ukraine and strengthen their
own protections against a possible Russian aggression. On Monday, NATO surpassed
The last obstacle to passing the membership of Sweden, less than a year
after Finland joined, an expansion of the military alliance that
challenges the hopes of President Vladimir Putin of Russia to fracture the
unity of their adversaries.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine said Sunday
that 31,000 Ukrainian soldiers had died fighting Russia. Their
Comments caught the attention for how rare they were; Participants in the
War almost never reveal casualties. But most analysts and
Western officials say that the number of victims is much higher.
From the beginning of the invasion, Russia has been willing to
pay especially high cost to advance in the east zone of
Ukraine known as Donbas, where Avdiivka is located. Parts of this
region traditionally Russian speaking have been occupied by representatives of
Russia since 2014, and when trying to justify the large -scale invasion, the
Kremlin has falsely affirmed that he is defending his Russian speakers,
saying they want to be part of Russia.
Some military analysts say that taking total control
DonBass is the minimum that the Russian government needs to present the
Invasion of Ukraine as a house victory. That may explain the will
from Moscow to absorb enormous losses to achieve marginal advances.
Avdiivka has been strategic and symbolic for propaganda
Russian war due to its proximity to Donetsk, the largest city in
DonBass, who has been under the occupation supported by Russia since 2014.
Ensure Avdiivka would take the Ukrainian artillery from the city, reducing the
civil population. casualties and pressure on the rearguard supply lines.
Kremlin's propensity to shoot more projectiles,
concentrate more people and rely on a much larger and capable air force on
This war allowed him to gradually change the course against the deep
Defenses of Ukraine in Avdiivka. The huge cost in injured and dead, some say
Analysts, it was only the byproduct of a strategy that achieved to a large extent
its objective, despite the loss of men and material, especially when
Western military aid and Ukrainian ammunition decreased
subsequently.
The latest for now.
A Russian military analyst close to the defense industry,
Ruslan Pukhov, wrote last week that the assault on Avdiivka was part of
a broader Russian strategy of pressing the Ukrainian forces throughout
of the entire 600 -mile front line with attacks and probes to exhaust
enemy "for a thousand cuts."
"This strategy, however, is quite expensive for
Russian armed forces in terms of losses, which could lead to
exhaustion of their forces, "Pukhov wrote in a Russian magazine of
present. “This, in turn, could give the Ukrainian part once again
initiative".
However, most analysts are broadcasting
Aleccuing evaluations on Ukraine's prospects for 2024 if not
Receive American help. As the war enters its third year,
Both sides struggle to find enough men to continue fighting
with the same level of intensity. The much greater population of Russia, around
of 144 million people, three times that of Ukraine, gives it an advantage
significant in labor.
The magnitude of Russia's losses has partially annulled
Impact of this arithmetic.
Kremlin's decision to summon 300,000 men in
September 2022 (for the first time since World War II) has
shocked and baffled to the nation, according to the polls. Hundreds of thousands
of men had already fled from the country when the war began, threatening with
Sur Sound the image of normality cultivated by Putin.
Since then, the government has tried to postpone the most
possible another round of mobilizations. Instead, incentives have promoted
financial and legal to attract the front as volunteers to convicts,
Debors, immigrants and other vulnerable social groups. It has also begun
to strictly enforce mandatory military service for men
Young people, previously lax, in the country.
In a publication published in the messaging application
Telegram on February 18, a Russian military blogger for war cited a source
Anonymous military who claimed that since October, the Russian forces had
suffered 16,000 "irreplaceable" human losses, as well as that of 300 vehicles
armored in the assault to Avdiivka. Ukrainian forces had suffered between
5,000 and 7,000 irreplaceable human losses in battle, wrote the
blogger Andrei Morozov.
These statements could not be verified independently.
Center for Strategic and
International Studies TRANSCRIPT Event “Ukraine in the Balance: A Battlefield
Update on the War in Ukraine” DATE Thursday, February 22, 2024 at 1:00 p.m. ET
Center for Strategic Studies and
International
TRANSCRIPTION
Event
“Ukraine in the balance: a
Update of the battlefield on the war
In Ukraine "
DATE
Thursday, February 22, 2024 at
13:00 hours. Eastern Time
HIGHLIGHTING
El Honorable Michael Vickers
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence
CSIS experts
Seth Jones
Senior Vice President; Harold chair
Brown; and director, international security program,
CSIS
Eliot A. Cohen
Arleight A. Burke Chair of
Strategy, CSIS
Emily Harding
Director, intelligence program,
National Security and Technology and Deputy Director,
International Security Program,
CSIS
Seth G. Jones:
Welcome to the Center for Strategic Studies and
International My name is Seth Jones. I am the director of the program of
International Security. It has been two years since the Russians invaded
Ukraine.
We are here to discuss a range of military issues,
Intelligence, political and other on the invasion, the state of the
war. And Eliot Cohen accompanies me. Eliot is the president of strategy of
Arleight Burke in CSIS, former counselor of the United States Department of State
and author of several books. Emily Harding, director of National Intelligence
Security and Technology Program, and Deputy Director of the International Institute
Safety program in CSIS. Also previously in the CIA, the service of
National Security Council, as well as the Select Intelligence Committee of the
Senate. And the Honorable Mike Vickers, former Deputy Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, Undersecretary of Special Operations, former Green Bina,
Official CIA operations.
But, most importantly, the author of the
Recently published memories, "By All Means Available" by Knopf, which
It was ... that it is a great book. Mike, thanks for doing that. And we had -
We have had a session about that as good. Let me start: if we could
Open the battlefield map. This is earlier this month. Us
We take out from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, Intelligence Defense. And the
What I wanted to do is remind everyone where we have come from. So you can't
See it on the map itself, but you visualize it after the initial attacks
Russians in at least five axes, did control the territory, some of the
which we can see here. They also tried to push down from
Belarus and parts of Russia to take kyiv, in what they failed. city of
Járkov, which, as you can see, is not under Russian control, in which they failed.
Then we saw multiple phases in which the Ukrainians could effectively
Resume part of this territory, here in Kharkiv, with an offensive operation.
Last year we saw the Russians resume territory, even in the south, in
Kherson. And where we are now they are a couple of things. We have recently
Seen the Russians to resume Avdiivka. I would say they are lit. The offensive.
They have military initiative at this time. They have not recovered much territory. We will talk
of the details in a moment. And we also have seen a lot of activity, the
Ukrainians point to Russian ships, infrastructure in Crimea and in the Black Sea
and its surroundings.
So, with that brief general description, a little
Where we have arrived, Eliot, I wanted to address you first and
Ask him how to characterize this stage of war at this time.
Eliot A. Cohen:
Well, I think we have gone through three phases. The
first phase, obviously,
The Russian invasion and the successful Ukrainian defense. But
keep in mind
that during that phase they could reach the doors of
kyiv, get a large part of the area around Kharkiv, and in fact
They could take
Kherson and overcome the Dnieper.
You had a second phase, which was a counteroffensive
Ukraine, which was really remarkably successful. Led them back
of Kyiv. The Russians ended up going back. The area cleaning ended
Around Kharkiv, some minor advances in the areas around
Slavyansk. They resumed the city of Kherson.
And now you are in the third phase, which already has some
time that
It has consisted of a series of attacks and counterattacks.
Russian attack a
Bakhmut, which finally took at a terrible price.
A Ukrainian offensive. I would not call it a counteroffensive, that was: he achieved
minor successes, but not much; The initiative passes into the hands of the
Russians
since they have taken avdiivka, again, at costs
terribly high.
This is a phase of positional war. I think it's a
Error to talk about it as a point of death, which is like some people talk about
it. This positional war seems quite familiar to historians
military where the initiative changes round trip, but where there is a lot
adaptation and innovation and change with the initiative going and coming.
And we don't know how much this positional phase can last.
it can last
a good time.
The other point that I think is important to highlight is
what is easy
become obsessed with the campaign in the field, which has
different parts because it is one - we are talking about a line of
Very long front.
In parallel an important
Naval campaign in which in fact, Ukrainians have had remarkable success to
do many damage to the Black Sea fleet saving, of course, its flagship,
But I also believe that five of nine of his landing boats, doing
effectively retreat to the Russians to some extent beyond the
Crimean Peninsula, thus releasing maritime routes
They have been able to export cereals, even more
Far to,
where
The Russians have moved some of their naval bases.
So that is another campaign.
There is a deep campaign of attacks in the
that the Russians are attacking Ukrainian infrastructure. They are attacking cities
and Ukrainian and others, in addition to a kind of bombing for
sow terror. But with the Ukrainians who also attack Russia to a minor
measure, but still with real effect both in missiles of different types but
Also special operations forces.
And then a kind of
Information war campaign in which both Russians and Ukrainians
They are trying to convince the public of different types in the West, in the
South global and other places, who has the advantage, in which direction it goes
This, what this is about.
I think it is very important to have in
account we have - there are multiple
Campaigns underway and each one is in a
different place.
Dr. Jones:
So, if we can open the map
Again, I want to concentrate a little, I want to stay on this subject and
Ask Mike and Emily, looking at the map I want to perfect here.
Some of the most recent activities we have seen are here in Avdiivka,
that the Russians have resumed at a big cost, we are listening to figures from
Victims, with a grain of salt, from more than 15,000 to 17,000. The Russian casualties, which
They are huge if that is true.
The Russians also press Bakhmut.
How ... Mike, for you first?
And then Emily, I mean, what is you
General opinion about the important or what success has this had for the Russians?
I mean, some people have done a big thing about this. than the Russians
They are now offensive. They have Avdiivka resumed. But what is you
sense?
The Honorable Michael G. Vickers:
Well, the Russians are investigating in
five addresses along this line and Avdiivka, I think they had
symbolic importance for Putin before your choice because basically, no
He had taken anything in a year from Bakhmut.
You know, it has some value. But you
He mentioned Russian losses. He
The exchange relationship was
Probably of the order of five to one, more or less, you know, a garnish
quite small from Ukrainians, as in other places, could contain the Russians
For a long time until they ran out of ammunition and personal.
Dr. Jones:
Emily, how important is this Russian success,
at least limited?
Emily Harding:
It is difficult to say that it was a success to
someone. If you have lost 17,000 soldiers - and we should mention that I had to
Killer one of his pro-kremlin bloggers to cover up the fact that
They lost 17,000 soldiers; That is not a success for Putin.
I think what Mike says about a
Little Ukrainian garrison that resists is absolutely true. There were some
sad numbers around 800 to a thousand. Ukrainian troops that could have
been captured when they tried to withdraw back and I think there are many criticisms
Really unfair to the way the Ukrainians backed away.
I mean, unless you've been
In that situation, I find it very difficult to say that, they did not execute it so well
As they could have done. But I believe that the Ukrainians and Europeans
They should insist on the fact that yes, the Russians achieved Avdiivka, but
At what price?
And look at the rest of that map. Will be able
pay that cost? Throughout that forehead?
Dr. Cohen:
I think, you know, I would address this for
one moment. I think part of the Russian intention in
All this is, first, to agree with Mike;
Putin wanted a symbolic victory of
some kind before the elections.
Maybe we want to talk a little about
How Russian politics affects all this.
But I think what the Russians are,
that the Russians want to do now is
convince everyone that the case
Ukrainian has no remedy.
Sra. Harding:
Yeah.
Dr. Cohen:
And that ... you know, and therefore, I think
that what they would probably do,
Ultimately, what I would like
to do is submit this to a negotiated agreement that is not permanent, which
I would simply prepare them for another offensive somewhere later. So
That, in a way, I think that is the real objective.
You know, the center of gravity, to
Using some military jargon is.
public opinion and the opinion of the
political elites, particularly in the United States, to persuade them of
that Ukraine simply cannot win; You know, the Russians are relentless,
have resources that are essentially infinite and an infinite will to
suffer. Now, I don't think any of those things is true, but I think
That is largely what the Russians want us to create.
Dr. Jones:
Then, Eliot, you mentioned the front. Yeah
We could increase only these advance rates, so we gathered this, rates of
progress for selective
combined weapons offensives between 1914
And 2023. I mean, I think it is true that the rhythm of progress of the offensive
Ukrainian last year
It was relatively slow. We evaluate between
On June 4 and August 28, 2023, they got about 90 meters per day,
which is quite slow.
They faced Russian defenses
strongly fortified with mined fields. So the Russians too
They could bring fixed -wing airplanes, helicopters and drones against tanks and
Ukrainian armored personnel who advance aircraft carrier and even infantry
disassembled But some people have raised the spectrum that this seems: the
situation looks like World War. So how to answer
that?
Dr. Cohen:
Well, I would respond in several ways.
I would start saying that it is really
A misinterpretation of what happened in World War I. You already know,
We, our mental image of World War I comes from an amount
of films in which it is only a group of snuggled types in a
trench,
Then they go up to the top and they are all
dejected by machine guns.
Actually, World War I
It was a very interactive war in which both sides are innovating the whole
time. It was a positional war. And then what happens? And this can be
A little misleading. You know, armies do not move at their average rhythm
Advance. What happens is that they are slugging, slugging, slugging, and then, boom, there are
A great advance and everything suddenly is going very deep.
This is like German offensives in 1918.
It is true for many wars. Even as the first Gulf War, there are,
You know, 40 days of bombing and then, suddenly, the war opens
land.
I think the other way in which the
World War I analogy is misleading - and again, it is because the
people do not know the story, the reality type of tactical and operational history
of World War I - is the assumption. This is simply a
butcher shop and there are many casualties. I do not want to minimize that - and it is absurd and there is no,
You know, no particular innovation. Actually, this is a war in the
That there is a lot of innovation, in which, I would say it in this way. I think the
Ukrainians innovate from the bottom to top and the Russians tend to innovate
from top to bottom. The Russians have a very vertical command system, by
What can be flexible. and learn and so on.
Ukrainians are a free society,
So there are many boys with interesting ideas that come out and try things and experiment.
Both ways to do so have their advantages and disadvantages. But what
It is certainly not, a, it is not static; And B, it is not a conflict in which only
There are people hitting their heads. others without a genuine guy from
Innovation and improvement by any of the sides.
Then exists - and what that
It means, ultimately, there is the potential for, you know, a
serious instability that goes from one side to another at any time, but certainly
during the next year more or less. You know, we should not assume that this will remain
So forever, because it won't be so.
Dr. Jones:
So Mike, have you seen big
surprises so far? Honorable. Vickers: First, let me agree
with Eliot about the deceitful parallels of World War I. An area
Where I think there is a bit of similarity is that it also has attributes of a
war of relative industrial capacity and the ability to permanent
Societies until you get the advances that Eliot spoke and continuous innovation.
So the big surprises are
simple. There are really two.
One, how bad the army has done
Russian, especially at the beginning of
stages but even the last year, of
This position war, Eliot spoke. AND
You know, wear fight, have
suffered much greater losses and simply, you know, I have not had a good
Performance from a military perspective. He
another side of the situation is the good that
The Ukrainians have done. Not only in defending its territory from the
beginning, but then recovering it. And Járkov and Kherson, as Eliot mentioned, and
Some of the innovations. You know, for a military without army, sinking
Much of the Black Sea fleet, taking part in the fight in
Russian territory also last week. Disadruido, you already know, seven airplanes
Russians That has gone very well. I wish there would be bigger surprises. There are two in
particular I have in mind. First, if I could go back the clock that
The United States did not chase. an incremental strategy. I think the Ukrainians
They would be much better if we had been bolder from the beginning.
Dr. Jones
With what? Long -range rockets or?
Honorable. Vickers:
Long -range projectiles, a
variety of aerial defenses, a variety of things that could have put the
Things we are doing now, you know, we should have started a
A couple of years and we made them more in all areas. And then him
The second is the decrease in support
in United States. I hope I could tell me that so many, particularly
In the Republican party, they are now turning against war and help
Ukrainian can be in danger. But it is not a surprise. But it is certainly
tragic.
Dr. Jones:
Well, that
It is a good transition for Emily. How would you value the American spare,
including debates in Congress? And in fact, before your answer, only
I want to mention something that the United States has provided so far.
Then we can go to the maps. Around 2 million bullets of 155
millimeters, 2,000- In addition to Stingers, Javelins and around 31 tanks
Abrams. All these are DOD numbers.
You see
Bradley, Obuses, Himars, a Patriot, Nasam, of Nasam,
stroke. Thus we have an idea of what the United States has provided since
that the invasion began. But what has been the American response more
recently?
Sra.
Harding:
Yes, I know it
It assumes that this graph should relieve my frustration, it is only a work species.
(Laughs.) I would call him hesitation. The United States response has been hesitant.
I think, without charity, you could say that we have been to play while Rome
burn. We have been debating among us, exactly what a little
Weapons system will take us to the top or not now for two years. And I think Mike
You are right. If we had not been hesitating early onwards, if
we would really have provided the things we should have
provided, I would have been much better now.
I
would classify the debate within the United States as partially
Self -devastation.
There is a cube
of that. And then partially self -centered. And the autodisuasion piece is this
constant convincing ourselves that if we provide the next system
or additional capacity, so that will be what leans to Russia to expand
the conflict. It simply has not happened. Russia as interested as us
in maintaining this restricted to Ukraine. And the more that we allow them to follow
advancing without retreating, the most will press. Russia is a thug. They respond
by force.
The piece
Egocentric is this completely counterproductive debate, in which there are people
That says, well, why are we sending all these resources to Ukraine? By
What do we spend all this money in Ukraine, when we really should leave it
Here for a fight in the Pacific? Or we should really be keeping it
here for internal priorities. Is
Simply the wrong way of seeing it.
In first
place, from a basic numerical perspective, I think Angus King of Maine has
A very good speech about this, the money we spend in Ukraine does not come out of
USA but goes to the American defense industry. It goes to the US
They send help to Ukraine. The vast majority stay here.
The other
part is that this is not or that. We have done a great job here. in it
Csis, I know that some of our colleagues in Washington have also done so, that
The types of weapons you need in a fight in the Pacific are very different
that the weapons that are needed in a fight in Ukraine. In addition, we have just seen
Japan takes a step forward and agrees to provide Ukraine all kinds of help. AND
As they pointed out in the press this morning, they share a common neighbor. So much Japan
and Ukraine borders Russia. And Japan understands that this is not a Europe or a fight in the Pacific. This is a
Global message for a thug superpower.
And that's where
We also have to think about it.
Dr. Cohen:
Can
participate in this? This is a really interesting table. So you know, order
Of magnitude, something like 10,000 javelins, that makes sense. That is the missile
anti -tank you need. The Abrams tank number. However, or with
Patriot batteries, that's ridiculous. I mean, and the problem is that we
We tell ourselves, oh, well, we have given you, you know, aerial defenses
high -end, the Patriots. But a battery? Thirty -one tanks? By
True, we have hundreds of stored Abrams tanks. These are the model
Old Abrams. They are not the ones who use our soldiers. They're available. Could
having gone there a long time ago. And I think it is reflected as a failure in what
Think: We have not managed to think with the proper urgency level. I am from
according to Mike and Emily in that. But we have not managed to think about the scale
correct.
Honorable.
Vickers: Escala.
Dr. Cohen:
And in part,
It has been a long time, actually from Korea, maybe. some parts of
Vietnam, but we have really involved in what is a war in which
There - wear occurs all the time. You know, I think we sometimes do
A false dichotomy - and I fear that even some of our thinkers
Military address it in this way: between maneuvers and wear. The wear is not
It is so much a strategy; It is a war condition. You know, I think of -
Dr. Jones:
And nobody wants to be in a war of
wear.
Dr. Cohen:
But every -
But if you are in a real war - if you are in a real war, you are in a
wear war. You know, I think of, say, 1967, the war of the six
Days, you know. The Israelis lost approximately a quarter of their
Air Force. And it is important - or if you look, say, you know, to the
Germans crossing France in 1940, they lost as a fifth of
His tanks, and you know, even higher percentages, I think. Think in your strength
Aerial Simply - if you are in a serious war against a war with serious opponent
- And by the way, it would also happen to us - you're going to take
big
Losses, and that means that you have to think about the right scale. And unfortunately,
I think that for our part there has been a systematic failure of thinking about the
Correct scale, with some exceptions such as the 155 millimeters rounds,
where we are finally expanding production, something that you already know a lot
about.
Dr. Jones:
Then yes. Yeah.
Sra.
Harding:
I can touch
That also with two fingers? So because I can listen to the screams
from interwebs, patriot batteries, I really understand that due
to the shortage of production in that system and because I know many of our
partners in the Middle East need them desperately to do things like
Fight against the hutis, who are shooting against Saudi Arabia. This is one
Reason, not an excuse. And this is where speech is inserted on the basis
Defense industrial and how we have not been pointing enough to
Personnel who manufacture things like patriot batteries, there will be a demand for them
will continue in the next two years, five years, 10 years, so the
production to meet demand; And even if we say for a second, that
Tomorrow peace explodes worldwide, we will continue to comply with those contracts,
So please construct them.
Honorable.
Vickers:
Yes. And I would add, you know, as my say
Old Chief Bob Gates, you know, you have to win the war you are.
Sra.
Harding:
Yeah.
Dr. Jones:
My old
Chief Mike Vickers also said that. (Laugh.) I want to return to a point, Emily,
what you did - you raised the perspective of other countries, including some of
Our adversaries. I think people can forget or not realize that
When it comes to the Russians, you know, the Russians have also spent
Significant amounts of ammunition in this war too. So, the
Ask, in part - and that goes through drones and - where do they get help
the Russians? And for those who want to focus or think we can
focus (the United States can only focus on one theater at the same time, so
that we should really focus on Taiwan, or even only Israel, or - and what
We cannot do that, the reality when you look cooperation is that the Chinese
They have provided significant help to the Russians. And it has been in all
Areas, not in wholesale weapons systems. But a range of technology for
Russian weapons systems that include everything from microchips for systems
Weapons to pieces for ammunition.
The
North Koreans have provided rockets and ammunition to the Russians. The Iranians have
provided the Shahed-136 and other drones. Then we are seeing the Russians receiving a variety of help
of the Chinese, of the North Koreans and the Iranians, which makes states
United retains your help at this time is surprising because we have not seen
The Chinese in that sense, stop providing assistance to the Russians.
Also
I wanted to understand your opinion, Emily, about Europeans and where are the
Europeans when providing help to Ukraine. There are also - it has also been
Talking that Germans would provide taurus, for example, that it is a
greater scope ammunition. what is your sense of where the Europeans are and
How useful have they been when providing help to Ukraine? And then
You know, if you can add something else.
We have
Listened to many criticisms. About Europeans by several politicians
Regarding its defense expenditure, including 2 percent of the gross domestic product.
Dr. Jones:
So,
Yeah. Yes. Mrs. Harding: mmm hmm. So, to complement your excellent
argument about China, we should not forget how much China has
Bought Russian cheap fuel, which is to keep the Russian economy afloat and allow them
do all the things they are doing. More than saying about that.
But when
These are Europeans, you know, I spent the first year of this war
reassuring European allies that the United States is in this to
The long term, which Biden has said that we are in this long term.
The Russians
They are an old enemy. We understand that this will be important not only for
Ukraine security but also for the security of Europe. Yes, there is talk of
Extremes about people, you know, they talk about their support to Ukraine. But
Those are the ends of the bell curve. They were in this long term. AND
Then, after a year passed, some of those bell -curved voices to the
end they obtained a little stronger and a little more central and then I found myself
Saying is going well. It's going to be OK. People like to add points
politicians. But they will recover.
Now me
I find in the situation of having to look at Europeans in the face and say: really
I don't know what will happen to the current help package. I still have hope
that the chamber enters into reason and approves it because it is of vital importance
for security in many ways.
Could be
Well for Ukraine and also for the United States at the same time.
But I think
that Europeans are really beginning to ask difficult questions about
They themselves: how does European security look like the presence of states
Joined? as?
The
unfortunate comments from former president Trump the other day about
I think that
Nan really shook them in a way that is difficult to ignore and are starting
to look at things from defense production to the end and through, already
You know, communications with each other.
We are
Seeing a silent defense production in some places and a defense
louder. production in others. They are far from being able to do it, right? already
They know, direct NATO without the United States, but some are being raised
Very difficult questions.
And finally
I want to point out that some of our colleagues here in the CSIS have made a
really good work in NATO and we are working on a project now
on whether the 2 percent threshold is really relevant, if there are other ways to measure what they should be
Really the contributions of NATO and if the 2 percent question is
Just a false track.
Dr. Jones:
Yeah,
Frankly, I think it is mainly a false track. I think the subject, to
end of the day - and I have also written about this - it is to what extent and how they are
Useful Europeans and high -level war, for example. So that
leads to aerial capabilities, land capacities, naval capacities, including
The anti -submarine war. That takes you out of the percentage problem. And much more to
The capacities to perform operations.
Dr. Cohen:
Let me not agree with that. Believe
That, on the one hand, it is important power to measure in a way, you know, more
Reasonable and militarily relevant operational contributions.
A figure
of 2 percent of GDP, which is too low; I mean, I would say it's shooting
at 3 (percent) or -
Dr. Jones:
state
United is closer to ... is in the range of 3 percent, right?
Dr. Cohen:
Is politically significant and is a message
for the public involved and for the governments involved that we hope
put important resources against their own defense and not put excuses and say,
Well, we are hosts your forces, that is also a contribution.
I don't know
I can ... I don't think we can ignore its psychological dimension. I wanted to add,
If I am allowed, two more things. One is American production. is
Absolutely fundamental because we have the largest military industry and despite my previous scathing criticisms,
We can expand things and get them on top. But it is also fundamental
because we provide leadership and the type of central focus for this. These
There are two - there are two types of industrial coalition competitors here. You
One mentioned, Russia - Iran, China in the background with components and things,
North Korea.
With us
They are the Europeans, obviously, with the United States. But, you know, the Koreans
Del Sur play a role and the Japanese play a role and states
United is critical for that. So, if ... you know, and the South Koreans
They sell 155 (- millimeters) so that we can then give ours
Ukrainians; Indeed part of the game. We have to be in the center of
that.
Now, I think
That is important because ... I mean, I think the four are we tend to
be quite critical, and properly, with our own government. In
reality, Russians are found differently in a world of pain.
They are ... already
You know, they are in a state of mobilization. It is not clear that
really
They have been able to increase military production in a tremendously way
significant. They still fight with the production of advanced parts. of team
military. You know, for example, they have had this T-14 armata. tank they have
State speaking for years. It is supposed to be incredible. system. Have had
Problems to implement it. They have had trouble getting it to occur.
Its fossil fuel income has been decreasing. Yes, the Chinese
They buy that oil. The Chinese are good merchants. And then they understand
that. Oil is cheap and they ... you know, they don't have the same pipelines
and those things. how that.
So I think
That, you know, the Russians - the very fact that they have to depend on the
North Koreans by 152 millimeter projectiles, which have as a caliber 30 percentage
Failure, he tells you something about his military industry. So you know,
We should remind ourselves that if we, if the United States
It is in the center, we propose it and keep the feet of our allies
Europeans on fire, we can easily overcome these types both in quantity
As in quality, safe, but I would say that even in quantitative terms.
But there has to be a lot of political energy put in it. AND
Unfortunately I don't see that.
Dr. Jones:
So, returning to its European point, yes, it is
important to spend more on the Ministry of Defense. That 2 percent threshold
In a certain sense, it simply highlights that. But at the end of the day, I think
It is also important how they are spending their money. So, if we can achieve
this. I'm going to go with Mike in a second with a question. But if we could show
The image here. I just want the
people see here. This is one of the Iranian drones, the Shahed. 136. This was
Disabled in kyiv, and is now in possession of Ukrainians. You can also see
Here it is an Iranian drone. And here this Iranian flag is on the side.
So this gives us an idea of some of the other countries that have been
providing assistance to the Russians.
What me
Take, Mike, the Russians. That is, its Russian military evaluation. You already spoke a
Little about this, but what do you have? Well done, in your sense? Where has you fought?
And are we seeing some? Evolution of the Russian concept of operations? They used
more air than had in the past in the offensive of Avdiivka. What does it mean
that?
Honorable.
Vickers:
So,
Where the Russians have done the best they can really be in this position of position
where they have had an artillery advantage and an advantage. AND
then those two things - and, in addition, the nine months, essentially, they were given
To dig, prepare, put mined fields and other things that made the
Ukrainian summer offensive last year was very problematic. That, and the
lack of aerial power of the Ukrainians. You know, we essentially ask
Ukrainians to fight a war in a way that the US army
or the Western military would never do it. And you know, you just can't
win that way. That is, it is military negligence.
So there
It is where they have done better. They have done the worst they have been able to in the field
Integrated combined weapons operations, airborne operations. AND
This is something we have seen with the Russian army in the Russian-Georgian war.
They thought they had plans to fix these things, you know, of the
learned lessons. They have not really done a good job. And you know, if everything
There seems to be worsened as the scale has increased. I mean, your
Great advantage at this time is really in resources. And it may be
more fragile than people think.
Dr. Jones:
Then yes
We could open the slide, just to emphasize what Mike noticed. Can
Look at this
It is ... this was last year. But we can see some of the Russian fighting of
positions. The trenches that raised here, the dragon's teeth. These
They are multiple rows of dragon teeth. You can't see it here because it is
buried, but the mined fields, the anti -tanks that have used, the
Mortar site and weapons locations they have had. They had
time during last year's offensive to strengthen some of these
defenses measures. What about Russian air?
Honorable.
Vickers:
Yes, the air
Russian, you know, it has been based mainly on missiles and aerial vehicles
Bened for strategic attack against populated centers. You know, and
He certainly had some success in that. In terms of air power in the field of
Battle, during the Ukrainian offensive they used attack helicopters reasonably
Good to limit Ukrainian penetrations. Fixed wing airplanes have not
done a lot. You know played a role in Avdiivka towards the end, when the
Ukrainian army was withdrawing under pressure -
Dr. Jones:
And I didn't have many Earth-Aire missiles.
Honorable.
Vickers:
And had no earth-Aire missiles. But mainly
He stayed behind the lines and plain pumps that can enter and
achieve objectives. And then it has not been a great player. You know, the
Russian doctrine integrates air with armies in the field, making the army
superior. A little different from our approach.
Me too
I would add that, you know, its operational advantages are
One thing. It
that the Russians really tell to win the war is
essentially
knocking out the allies of Ukraine. Basically cutting international support.
You know, Eliot talked about this and Emily talked about political problems in the
Congress. But you know, that's his theory. of the victory, is that if it is cut
Help, will have a much better opportunity.
Dr. Jones:
Well,
Because they also receive help. Then the balance of power changes dramatically.
Honorable.
Vickers:
If they
They also receive help. The balance of power changes, exactly.
Sra.
Harding:
This is one of those self -complicated prophecies of
those that spoke at the beginning. What is the message that Russians want
Let's absorb? that Ukraine cannot win, so we should withdraw the support.
And that idea that this is going to be totally self -fulfilled, which once we accept
The Russian policy of line then we go back, which makes it true, I think that
It is what we have to protect at all costs.
Honorable.
Vickers:
I think that
Lenin called them useful idiots.
Dr. Cohen:
Well, and in
a way is already happening. I mean, even put Tucker aside
Carlson, you know, you look at Senator Vance of Ohio. I mean, that's ... it's
saying what Russians would like me to say. that there is no way that
The Ukrainians can win, so we are realistic and stop helping them.
Dr. Jones:
Well,
Emily, the Russians have also been active in many other areas. We have seen
Navalny face death. We have seen a Ukrainian deserter probably
Killed in Spain. What else do you have? I mean, what are you doing with what they are
doing the Russians now in various fields?
Sra.
Harding:
I mean, they get paid in a way that
It seems quite surprising. What is clear: Navalny did not fall dead because
own will in a Russian prison. I know in my bones as sure as
I'm sitting here, and I didn't even have to do it. Be on the floor with him.
We will discover it at some point in the future that was in fact killed, and it was
Killed at a certain time for a certain reason. The fact that Putin
It has allowed it just before Munich the conference is quite interesting.
That came out almost at the same time that some news arose about some
New Russian capabilities potentially being in space, I think it is very
interesting.
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